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Sovereign Immunity
International law has long reasoned that since states are independent and
equal, no state may exercise jurisdiction over another without the latter's
consent. It followed from that principle that the courts of one state could
not assert jurisdiction over a foreign state without its consent. However,
with the advent of state trading and other commercial initiatives by sover-
eign governments, the conceptual underpinnings of sovereign immunity
were loosened. Whatever deference was due a sovereign state could hardly
justify giving it a competitive advantage over private commercial entities
when both were engaged in ordinary commercial activities.
On May 9, 1952, Jack B. Tate, then Acting Legal Adviser to the Depart-
ment of State, advised the Justice Department that customary international
law evinced a trend away from the traditional absolute doctrine of sovereign
immunity toward a newer, restrictive doctrine which distinguished between
governmental acts (acts iure imperit) and commercial acts (acts iure ges-
tionis) such that, in general, while engaged in the latter a state is not entitled
to immunity. The letter became known as the "Tate letter" and has come to
symbolize the trend it described.
Until recently, the way the restrictive doctrine worked in practice in the
United States put a diplomatically uncomfortable burden on the Executive
Branch to determine whenever the question was raised whether a particular
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activity of a foreign state or one of its agencies was governmental or com-
mercial. Congress finally relieved the Executive Branch of the burden by its
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §
1605, which both codifies the restrictive doctrine and establishes a jurisdic-
tional and procedural basis by which private claimants can assert claims and
enforce final judgments against foreign governments engaged in commer-
cial activities on something approaching the same basis as the claimants
would be able to do if the defendant were not a sovereign government.
Under the Act a plaintiff may bring a foreign state or one of its political
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities before an American court, ob-
tain a ruling on the defendant's sovereign immunity from the court and, if
immunity is found not to exist, secure an adjudication and satisfaction of its
claim. The Act virtually eliminates prejudgment attachment of foreign gov-
ernment property, but provides other methods for effecting service of pro-
cess against the foreign government defendant and establishes a statutory
basis for execution against commercially-related foreign government prop-
erty to satisfy final judgments.
One effect of the foregoing trade-off is to substitute in personam jurisdic-
tion for the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction which previously obtained whenever,
as was often the case, prejudgment attachment was the basis of jurisdiction.
The use of jurisdictional attachments had been a cause of friction both
because the fortuitous presence of property within the forum did not guar-
antee a nexus with the litigation and because multiple attachments in vari-
ous jurisdictions were often resorted to.' The difference in jurisdictional
bases before and after the effective date of the Act is the subject of discus-
sion in National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), one of a number of lawsuits instituted in the
United States and Europe by various plaintiffs against the Nigerian Govern-
ment, its Ministry of Defense and/or the Nigerian Central Bank in light of a
monumental fiasco involving the suspension of the unloading of cement at
the Port of Lagos and the cancellation of a number of cement supply
contracts which had been entered into by the Government in 1975. Included
among the claims were several for demurrage, the instant suit being, in part,
one such claim.
It was brought in June 1976, before the effective date of the Act. Plaintiff
obtained jurisdiction by attaching Nigerian Government funds on deposit in
New York banks. When the Act did become effective, defendants moved to
dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity and the
related but different Act of State doctrine.2 Federal district court Judge
I H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 26-27, cited at 448 F. Supp. at 638.2Whereas the sovereign immunity doctrine accords a defendant exemption from suit, the Act
of State doctrine precludes a suit from going forward when a court determines that to do so
will require judicial inquiry into the validity or motives behind the public acts of a foreign
government. The equivalent for Act of State purposes of the restrictive doctrine in sovereign
immunity would appear to be the commercial exception apparently enunciated by some of the
judges in Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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Gerard L. Goettel observed that the attachment would not be permissible
under the Act and that if the jurisdictional attachment were dissolved in
personam jurisdiction under the Act would be the only means of asserting
jurisdiction. Acknowledging that the parties had extensively briefed the
issue of whether the Act's jurisdictional provisions apply retroactively,3
Judge Goettel nonetheless appears to have sidestepped the question, noting
instead that defendants had raised their jurisdictional challenge somewhat
belatedly and, therefore, "because this case has been litigated throughout
on the assumption that only quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was asserted, and no
amendment to the pre-trial order was sought to counter defendant's chal-
lenge to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, plaintiff's claim msut be limited to the
funds attached." 448 F. Supp. at 639.'
The jurisdictional provisions of the Act extend to commercial activities
outside the United States which cause "a direct effect" in the United
States.5 In Carey v. National Oil Corporation, 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), a complaint brought under the Act was dismissed on the grounds that
this provision embodies the due process requirement that there exist "mini-
mum contacts" with the United States in order for United States courts to
exercise jurisdiction. The court found insufficient the "contact" described
as the foreseeability that oil which was the subject of the contract allegedly
breached by defendant was destined for United States markets.6
'Other retroactive aspects of the Act have been addressed by the courts in Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, TASS, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed infra, and Martro-
pico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara
(Pertamina), 428 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
'At another point the decision notes: "Much of the trial was devoted to jurisdictional issues.
Although never raised by defendants in either a motion to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
or in their answer, the pre-trial order provided that the pleadings would be deemed amended to
include issues raised therein.
"As part of their jurisdictional defense, defendants have raised issues relating to the suffi-
ciency of and non-receipt of process, although these grounds were not explicitly preserved in
the pre-trial order. Issues of this type obviously should have been litigated when defendants
first entered their 'special appearance' and will not be considered now." 448 F. Supp. 622 at
632n.
"'A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States or of the States in any case ... (2) in which the action is based . . .upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States ...... [28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(2)]
6The dispute involved the alleged breach of an oil supply contract between the National Oil
Corporation, a marketing arm of the Libyan Government, and a Bahamian subsidiary of an
American corporation. Neither National nor the Bahamian subsidiary did business in the
United States, nor were the contracts involved in the dispute negotiated or performed in the
United States. The oil was sold to the Bahamian corporation, refined in the Bahamas or
elsewhere outside the United States and then sold to the Bahamian corporation's U.S. parent
company, which resold it in the United States. The issue was whether the foreseeability that the
oil would end up in United States markets was sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts"
test. The court thought it was not. But see Gray v. American Radiator Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761
(11. Sup. Ct. 1961); and Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes, 15 N.Y.2d 443 (1965)
which, in another context, support the view that foreseeability of impact does constitute
sufficient contact for due process purposes.
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The substantive portions of the Act are not without their own share of
ambiguities. For example, when the defendant is a commercial entity from a
socialist state, the first step in relying on the Act seems to be that of
determining whether the entity is an "agency or instrumentality" of the
state. In two of the first cases litigated on this point, that determination
involved judicial construction of the Act's inclusion of entities "whose
shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof. . . ." In the first of these, Edlow International Co. v.
Nuklearna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977), the federal district court
for the District of Columbia, finding no suggestion in the Act's legislative
history that a foreign state's system of ownership, without more, should be
regarded as determinative of an entity's status under the law, dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction an action brought by a Bermuda corporation (the bro-
ker in sales of nuclear fuel) against a Yugoslav workers' organization (the
buyzr). The precise indices of an entity's status as a state agency, according
to the court, include (a) the degree to which the entity discharges a govern-
mental function, and (b) the extent of state control over the entity's opera-
tions. The Yugoslav state does exercise ultimate control over the
organization's policies, the court said, but neither that nor the degree to
which the organization is subject to government regulation aimed at as-
suring compliance with government goals is necessarily determinative of the
entity's status as a state agency or instrumentality.
In the second case, Yessenin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, TASS, 443
F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a libel action in which two Communist party
newspapers were held to be entitled to claim sovereign immunity under the
Act, the status of one of the newspapers (Novosti) also turned on the
question of the state's "ownership." Plaintiff had contended that Novosti's
relation to the Soviet state is defined by its charter, which provides that
"[nJo Soviet state organ bears responsibility for the business activities and
financial obligations or any other actions of the Agency." But the district
court for the southern district of New York felt that the relevant test is
simply one of "ownership" - i.e., whether the state "owns" the entity, not
whether the entity is, in fact, self-administering.
The issue may be argued again in a case now pending in the southern
district. East Europe Import-Export Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 77
Civ. 2809, 3045 and 2348, is a consolidation of three suits brought by
American companies to recover damages for breaches of contract and of
letters of credit in connection with the 1975 Nigerian cement contracts,
supra. Plaintiffs in East Europe allege that the Nigerian Government re-
neged on their contracts and that the Central Bank of Nigeria instructed its
correspondent banks not to make further payments under the relevant let-
ters of credit without additional clearance requirements beyond what had
been set forth in the original contracts.
7
'The Nigerian Government appears to have invited the cement contractors to Lagos to
negotiate a settlement. Some of the suppliers, their shipments already at the port, may have felt
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Nigeria moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the Act,
sovereign immunity and/or the Act of State doctrine. But on September 19,
1978, a United States magistrate reporting to the federal district court judge
hearing the case recommended that the motion be denied, finding the acts
involved ones of a commercial nature of the sort which the Act excludes
from immunity. If the recommendation is followed, the case is expected to
go to trial early in 1979.
As noted earlier, others of Nigeria's cement supply contractors have
brought actions against the Government, its Ministry of Defence and the
Central Bank in Europe. In many ways the most interesting of these actions
is one brought in the United Kingdom, Trendtex Trading Corporation v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 WLR 356 (dated January 13, 1977, re-
printed in 17 ILM , and found in The Weekly Law Reports, March 4,
1977). In Trendtex the British Court of Appeal overturned a lower court
ruling which had sustained defendant's claim of sovereign immunity. The
court held that (1) the bank, which had been created as a separate legal
entity with no clear expression of intent that it should have governmental
status, was not an emanation, arm, alter ego or department of the state of
Nigeria and was therefore not entitled to immunity from suit, and (2) even if
the bank were part of the Government of Nigeria, "since international law
now recognize[s] no immunity from suit for a government department in
respect of ordinary commercial transactions as distinct from acts of a gov-
ernmental nature, it [is] not immune from suit on the plaintiff's claim in
respect of the letter of credit." 8
Trendtex was appealed to the House of Lords, but was settled before that
body could rule on it.9 Lords did get to rule on an analogous issue in a case
decided July 6, 1978, C. Czarkinow Ltd. v. Rolimpex (summarized unoffi-
cially in Halsbury's Laws of England, July 1978, at p. 12). In Rolimpex
Lords affirmed a Court of Appeal ruling" that a Polish state trading or-
constrained to waive their claims on the uncompleted portions of their contracts in order to get
paid for cement already shipped and for demurrage. But some of the suppliers which had not
yet begun delivery instituted lawsuits, this one being one of those.
8[19771 2 W.L.R. 356. Stephenson L.J. felt unable to concur in this aspect of the decision,
being troubled by the majority's reasoning that precedent cases incorporating the absolute
doctrine did not bind the court because sovereign immunity is based on international law which
knows no rule of binding precedent. Lord Denning and Judge Shaw said that in treating a
question of customary international law, the courts of the United Kingdom should follow the
lead of other countries and replace the doctrine of absolute immunity with a rule of restrictive
immunity. Judge Shaw felt, moreover, that in the conditions prevailing at present in interna-
tional law the principle of restrictive immunity achieves a more just result than that of absolute
immunity as it takes into account both sovereign status and the nature of the transaction.
'It was subsequently cited in Great Britain in The I Congreso del Partido, [19771 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 536 (Queen's Bench Division), a case in which a claim of sovereign immunity was
unsuccessfully interposed by the Government of Cuba as a bar to a suit brought by a Chilean
company to recover the proceeds of a sale of goods. The proceeds were being held in a Cuban
bank pending the emergence in Chile of a regime favored by Cuba.
" 19771 All E.R. 81.
172 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
ganization was not an integral part of the Polish Government and so was
entitled to rely on a force majeure clause when its performance of a sugar
supply contract was frustrated by the intervention of the Polish Govern-
ment. The breach occurred following the failure of Poland's domestic sugar
harvest, when the Polish Government banned all sugar exports and revoked
all export licenses. Plaintiff contended that the trading organization was not
only an organ of the Polish Government but was also a co-conspirator with
it in a conspiracy to avoid the contract and thus obviate the organization's
having to buy expensive sugar to fulfill its contractual obligations. Lords
held, Lord Salmon dissenting, that English courts should be reluctant to
examine the motives of foreign governments. The seller appeared to be an
independent body; the Polish Government's ban on sugar exports had been
imposed not to avoid contractual liability but for domestic and social rea-
sons and to preserve foreign exchange; and a contractual undertaking by the
seller to obtain the necessary import licenses merely meant that the sellers
had to get one, which they had done, not that they were obliged to, nor
could they, ensure its continuing validity.
Lords' penchant for Act of State-like deference notwithstanding, Parlia-
ment has now codified the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity in
legislation, entitled "State Immunity Act 1978," which took effect on Octo-
ber 26, 1978. The Act confers a general right of immunity for foreign states,
then treats this right as inapplicable if a state has waived it or if the proceed-
ings in which it is involved are of a commercial, industrial, financial, pro-
fessional or similar nature or relate to a contractual obligation to be per-
formed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. Immunity is specifically
precluded in a variety of circumstances set forth in the statute.''
Three other recent rulings confirm the current popularity of the trend
described in the Tate letter. Two of these, in Europe, grow out of the
Nigerian cement matter. In a German case, YoussefM.Nada Establishment
v. Central Bank of Nigeria (File No. 3/8 0 14/76 of the District Court of
Frankfurt-au-Main, dated August 25, 1976), defendant's claim of sovereign
immunity was rejected "because for its civil act, the opening of a [letter of
credit] in the framework of the banking business, the defendant does not
enjoy immunity in the Federal Republic of Germany" (unofficial English
IE.g., proceedings arising out of an employment contract which is made in or is to be wholly
or partly performed in Great Britain; proceedings in respect of death, personal injury or
damage to or loss of property; and proceedings relating either to immovable property in Great
Britain or to a state's interest in any property arising out of succession, gift or bona vacantia.
British courts, under the Act, may exercise their jurisdiction over any property relating to
decedents' estates or estates of persons of unsound mind, to the insolvency or winding up of
companies or to the administration of trusts, regardless of any interest or claim of a sovereign
state in that property. Likewise, immunity is unavailable to states in proceedings relating to
patents, trademarks, designs or plant breeders' rights belonging to them and registered, protec-
ted or applied for in Great Britain; in proceedings involving a state's membership in a body
corporate, unincorporated body or partnership; and in arbitrations in Great Britain to which it
has agreed to submit a dispute.
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translation). Similarly, in an arbitration in Paris under the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce's Court of Arbitration, Ipitrade In-
ternational c/ Ministry of Defence of Nigeria (Case RT/DB No. 2949,
award dated April 25, 1978, reprinted in 17 ILM ), the sole arbitrator, Dr.
Max Brunner, applying Swiss law, rejected defendant's contention of sover-
eign immunity, saying:
A sovereign country can, like a private person, corporation or company, enter
into business transaction[s] with another party. The contract in dispute is such an
ordinary business transaction, a sales and purchasing contract between parties of
equal reciprocal rights. The Defendant voluntarily agreed thereby that the con-
tract be governed by the laws of Switzerland ... and voluntarily agreed that all
disputes in relation to the contract be submitted to the arbitration of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in accordance with its rules. According to Swiss
law the Defendant is bound by the obligations it voluntarily entered into. The
obligation to submit to arbitration in case of a dispute is one of them and
sovereign immunity does not dispense from it.' 2
Finally, in a Canadian case, Zodiak International Products Inc. v. Polish
People's Republic (1977), 81 DLR (3d) 656, an action instituted by a Cana-
dian company for damages growing out of a breach of a commercial con-
tract, the Court of Appeal of Quebec reversed a lower court ruling which
had dismissed the suit on the grounds of defendant's sovereign immunity.
Arbitral Awards
Law governing long-term economic development agreements - meaning of
"expropriatory action'" under investment guaranty - legal effect of sover-
eign contractual obligations - applicable law of AID guaranty contract
Traditionally, contracts between sovereign states and foreign private par-
ties have been regarded as governed solely by municipal law. A series of
international arbitrations, mostly involving the cancellation of oil conces-
sion rights and the expropriation of attendant properties, has raised the
possibility that customary international law now treats them as being gov-
erned by principles of international law as well. That possibility is affirmed
by the recent ruling of two of three arbitrators appointed to decide whether
a claimant American corporation was entitled to compensation for losses
growing out of what it claimed was expropriatory action by a foreign gov-
ernment. The two arbitrators concluded that, at least, an exception to the
traditional rule now obtains in respect of long-term economic development
agreements between host countries and foreign private entities. The third,
dissenting, arbitrator would not have reached the question in the instant
case.
'From the certified copy dated April 26, 1978, signed by Yves Derains, Secretary-General of
the Court of Arbitration.
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The arbitration'" involved an investment guaranty contract entered into
by Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated ("Revere"), a Maryland cor-
poration, and the United States Agency for International Development
("AID") in 1970. The guaranty insured Revere against the risk of loss from
"expropriatory action" with respect to an investment Revere was making in
a wholly-owned subsidiary, also an American corporation, pursuant to a
long-term contract which the subsidiary had entered into with the Govern-
ment of Jamaica in 1967. The investment involved the construction and
operation in Jamaica of a bauxite mining operation, a plant to convert the
bauxite to alumina and related facilities.
The relevant definition of "expropriatory action" in the guaranty con-
tract encompasses
any action which is taken, authorized, ratified or condoned by the Government of
the Project Country, commencing during the Guaranty Period, with or without
compensation therefor, and which for a period of one year directly resulting in
preventing:
... the Foreign Enterprise from exercising effective control over the use or
disposition of a substantial portion of its property or from constructing the
Project or operating the same.
The key words, all three arbitrators agreed, were "exercising effective con-
trol." The issue dividing them was whether a series of legislative and ad-
ministrative steps taken by Jamaica had so deprived Revere's subsidiary.
What had happened, in essence, is that in 1972 a newly elected govern-
ment announced major changes in national economic policy bearing di-
rectly upon the important beauxite industry. The government's objectives
were to obtain greater revenue from the industry and to eventually take
direct control of it through majority ownership of production companies.
Putting the first part of this policy into effect, the government initiated and
put into effect legislation which (a) led to the revocation of existing mining
leases and licenses and their replacement with ones, inter alia, of shorter
duration and (b) imposed bauxite production taxes tied to new minimum
production levels, tied, that is, in the sense that the production levels were
deemed for tax purposes to have been achieved whether they actually had
been or not. The measures were in direct and explicit contradiction to
undertakings contained in the 1967 agreement. Their effect was severe, both
in direct financial terms, costing Revere's subsidiary some $19 million in
direct tax payments to the government, and in terms of the stability of the
contractual relationship the 1967 agreement had established. In the latter
sense, the effect was magnified by the political climate created by the new
government in announcing and carrying out the new national policies.
" In the Matter of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated and Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, Case No. 16 10 0137 76 dated August 24, 1978 (hereinafter called "Award").
The decision is reprinted in 17 I.L.M. (November 1978).
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It was clear to all three arbitrators'" that the mere breach of the 1967
agreement by Jamaica would not by itself have automatically triggered the
guaranty's compensation clause, since the language of the guaranty explic-
itly says otherwise, viz.
The abrogation, impairment, repudiation or breach by the Government of the
Project Country of any undertaking, agreement or contract relating to the Project
shall be considered an Expropriatory Action only if it constitutes Expropriatory
Action in accordance with the criteria set forth in this section.
But that did not dispose of the question of whether the actions resulted in
preventing Revere's subsidiary from exercising effective control over the use
or disposition of a substantial portion of its property or from operating it.
The majority view, in fact, was that the question of the breach or repudia-
tion of the 1967 contract and that of effective control were inextricably
intertwined, because if the Jamaican Government had in fact repudiated the
contract the effect of that repudiation would be to so destabilize the deci-
sion making process which control of a large industrial enterprise entails as
to render effective managerial control impossible.
Rational decisions require some continuity of the enterprise. In a large enterprise
like the present one, with the contract gone decisions simply become gambles.
Risks are inherent in all such decision making, but without the contract the odds
cannot be calculated. There is no way in which rational decisions can be made.
What the Government did yesterday it can do tomorrow or next week or next
month. If it did one thing yesterday, it can do something else tomorrow or next
week or next month.
This is the antithesis of the rational decision making that lies at the heart of
control. Here "effective control" not only of the contract but of the entire
operation has been lost, due directly to the action of the Government."
The dissenting arbitrator, finding the question completely resolved by the
words of the guaranty contract itself, disagreed:
The uncertainty and doubt faced by business management in such a situation
are, in my view, plainly not the direct prevention of control within OPIC's'"
undertaking of guaranty. There is no resemblance whatever to the actual situation
in Jamaica of [Revere's subsidiary] which not only remained fully in control of its
business, but asserted and exercised its legal right to decide and carry out its
decision to close down its Jamaica plant for economic reasons."
The majority countered that the test had to be one of practical and not
merely theoretical or formal control and added:
If this analysis is not valid, if physical impact on a substantial portion or all of
the property or on the operation of the enterprise is needed to trigger [the guar-
anty contract's compensation provision], one must ask at what point, if ever, in a
"These were G. W. Haight and Carroll R. Wetzel of the New York and Pennsylvania Bars,
respectively, constituting the majority, and Hon. Francis Bergan, retired member of New
York's Court of Appeals, dissenting.
"Award, pp. 58-59.
'The U.S. Government-owned Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") suc-
ceeded to AID's rights and obligations under the guaranty contract.
"Award, pp. 122-123.
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complex industrial operation such as we have here, involving large investments,
will the cumulative impact of the inability to make rational decisions in fact
trigger this [provision]?
Must one wait until there has occurred something akin to the troops coming in,
little by little or all at once, in a nineteenth century sense? Must there be some
physical impact? In our view such narrow interpretation of the contract of insur-
ance does not fit the realities of today and was not intended by the framers of [the
provision].' 8
It was thus logically essential that the majority find that the 1967 agree-
ment had indeed been repudiated, not because breach or repudiation as
such triggered the compensation but because, as explained, outright repu-
diation would have deprived Revere's subsidiary of the stability of expecta-
tions essential to continued rational business decision making. As to this,
the majority was confronted by the fact that in January 1976, after it had
closed its Jamaican plant, Revere had instituted an action against the Ja-
maican Government in the Supreme Court of Jamaica, claiming breach of
contract and seeking an injunction against the imposition of the bauxite
production tax. That court, applying Jamaican law, had held that no breach
had occurred because the 1967 contractual commitment not to impose addi-
tional taxes had been ultra vires, void ab initio, because Ministers could not
fetter the sovereign power of Parliament to legislate with respect to tax-
ation. Therefore, "no valid contractual right" had ever obtained.'"
If the court's ruling was dispositive on the question of breach or repudia-
tion, then that also settled the matter of Revere's claim, the majority said.
But while accepting the court's view as dispositive as to Jamaican law, the
majority concluded that because of the nature of the contract and the
reciprocal undertakings it put into effect the 1967 agreement was governed
by principles of international law as well. 2"
That is, the invalidity of the contractual provision under Jamaican law
did not establish its invalidity under principles of international law. Apply-
ing such principles, they found the Jamaican Government's action had
amounted to an abrogation and repudiation of the agreement.
From the perspective of international law, in the majority's view, the
question of Jamaica's power to impose taxes, far from being fettered by the
agreement, is in no way affected by it. Governments routinely enter into
treaties which commit them to refrain from some future exercise of sover-
eign power. Hardly denying the prerogative in question, the treaty has the
"Award, p. 60.
"The court, however, did hold that the bauxite levy could not be imposed when the company
was not actually producing bauxite. See Award, p. 16.2 In an opinion dated just one day prior to the Award, a Texas state court applying Texas
conflicts rules held that Libyan national law governs the nature of rights conferred by an oil
concession agreement between Libya and a foreign private entity. Nelson Bunker Hunt v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Company, No. 1809 (Fourteenth Court of Civil Appeals, Hous-
ton) (slip opinion dated August 23, 1978).
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effect of confirming it, in the sense that the waiver of some prerogative
necessarily implies the right to the prerogative in the first place. But once
having undertaken this international commitment, the state is under an
obligation to fulfill it. It may reassert its sovereign prerogative at some
future time, but in doing so incurs liability under international law if that
assertion involves breaking the treaty or, in this instance, the international
agreement. Thus, the agreement was valid under international law and a
breach of it was a violation of international law.
In this respect, the majority quoted with approval from United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) ("Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources") and from several prominent international arbitrations
for support for the proposition that as a matter of customary international
law agreements between aliens and host governments which are governed by
international law must be carried out in good faith even if they conflict with
the constitution or other national law of the host country.2 '
However, it is Revere, not OPIC, which is challenging the Award, since
Revere's victory in principle turns out to be nearly pyrrhic in dollars and
cents. If fully vindicated Revere's claim would have approached one hun-
dred million dollars. Under the Award it receives just over one million
dollars. The difference lies in a series of downward "adjustments" claimed
by OPIC with which the majority arbitrators, for the most part, agreed.
The largest single adjustment involved a write down of over forty million
dollars in respect of the recoverability of balance sheet values. The issue, in
essence, was whether the value of the assets of its subsidiary carried on
Revere's books as of the date of expropriation complied with generally
accepted accounting principles. It did not, the arbitrators concluded, be-
cause it failed to reflect the uncertainty as of that time of the recoverability
of the subsidiary's assets.22
"They had little to say, however, with respect to more recent General Assembly resolutions
(such as the so-called "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States") which accord the
redistribution of the world's wealth a higher priority than the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.
As to these, the majority referred only to another arbitrator's dictum which denied legal value
to recent General Assembly resolutions on this point. It is not unlikely that this aspect of the
decision, at least, will be challenged as too little reflective of the real state of customary
international law.
""Recoverability," the majority arbitrators said, is a fundamental accounting concept
which essentially relates to the ability to convert into cash an investment in fixed plant through
the generation of earnings (or an investment in inventory through the sale of the inventory).
Recoverability becomes a matter of concern where, as in this case, there are continuing losses
in connection with the fixed plant and significant uncertainty as to whether the fixed plant can
recover its investment. If the uncertainty is created solely by the expropriatory actions which
give rise to a claim for compensation, then requiring the claimant to write down the value of its
assets to reflect the uncertainty is a little like allowing the child who has murdered his parents
to beg the court's mercy because he is an orphan. That is, the ultimate defendant would be
profiting from the very actions which are the basis of its culpability. In the present case,
however, the majority arbitrators found that the continuing uncertainty of recoverability of
stated asset values had set in prior to the government's expropriatory actions. Cost overruns
appeared to have been fundamental to the plant's production operations; costs, even before
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The majority arbitrators also directed a substantial (approximately twelve
million dollar) downward adjustment in the value of the subsidiary's assets
to remove the effect of a tax credit allocated in Revere's consolidated tax
return to the subsidiary in respect of its losses. The effect of the allocation
was to increase the subsidiary's book value, but in the arbitrators' view that
increase should not be allowed for the purpose of computing Revere's "net
investment" as that term is defined in the guaranty contract. Moreover,
they (a) directed a substantial adjustment downward of the value ascribed
by Revere to its subsidiary's assets to reflect the adjustment called for under
applicable accounting principles for the fact that Revere had failed to
charge its subsidiary interest on loans it extended to it; (b) rejected as not
called for by the guaranty contract Revere's claim to be reimbursed for the
nineteen million dollars in taxes invoiced by the Jamaican Government in
contradiction to the terms of the 1967 agreement; and (c) rejected on similar
grounds the cost of litigating the breach of contract question in Jamaica,
the cost of plant maintenance borne by Revere which Revere said would
inure to OPIC's benefit and Revere's claim to interest on the amount of the
Award from the date of expropriation.
They did agree with Revere's claim to recover the value of certain capita-
lized development and exploration costs, depletion charges and the amount
of premiums paid to OPIC for its guaranty subsequent to the date of
expropriation, and did award Revere the cost of arbitration.
United States Legislation
Multiple Currency Clauses
For the purpose of discharging legal obligations, American law presumes
that the value of money remains constant. As Justice Holmes wrote in
Deutsch Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926): "Obviously in fact a
dollar or a mark may have different values at different times, but to the law
that establishes it, it is always the same." Chronic inflation has rendered
this assumption expensively obsolete, and despite the adoption of the doc-
trine of commercial impracticability by both the Uniform Commercial
Code (§ 2-615) and The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (§ 281, Tent.
Draft No. 9, April 1974), American courts have been reluctant to utilize this
doctrine to counteract inflation-induced contractual distortions.
Draftsmen of contracts whose performance is deferred over a period of
years have themselves used a variety of verbal formulae to maintain the real
economic value of contractual obligations. The most notable of these have
been commodity (especially gold and silver), foreign currency and price
the election of Jamaica's new government in 1972, appeared to be such that operating results
were becoming critical. Thus, had it been a separate company (i.e., had Revere not been able to
absorb its losses) the subsidiary's assets would have had to be written down in any case. The
same conclusion seemed to be called for in light of the inadequacy of the plant, the recognized
necessity of its expansion and related factors.
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index clauses. For international lawyers, the drafting problem was compli-
cated in 1975 by the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Aztec
Prop. v. Union Planters National Bank, 530 S.W. 2d 756 (1975), cert. den.
425 U.S. 975, to the effect that index clauses are in conflict with the so-
called "gold clause" resolution passed by Congress in 1933 (Joint Resolu-
tion of 1933, 48 Stat. 112 (1933), 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1970), which says:
"Every obligation ...shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar,
in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for
public and private debts." 2 The same clause has been interpreted since 1939
as rendering multiple foreign currency clauses invalid in the United States,
if the United States dollar is included as one of the possible currencies of
payment. 2
In October 1977, however, Congress included among other "technical
amendments" tacked on to Public Law 95-147 (91 Stat. 227, approved
October 28, 1977) a section which provides:
The ["gold clause"] joint resolution . . .shall not apply to obligations issued on
or after the date of enactment of this section.
Its legislative history suggests that this section was intended by Congress
to permit gold clauses in loan agreements,25 and most subsequent discussion
of the provision has focused on this aspect of it. But its more profound
impact for practicing lawyers may actually lie in the likelihood that it also
removes any statutory bar to including dollars among several alternative
media of payment in multiple currency bonds and other contracts, espe-
cially, one would think, international commercial contracts.
Treaties
Succession to Treaties
The second session of the United Nations Conference on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties, held in Vienna from July 31 to August 23,
1978, adopted a proposed convention on succession to treaties (U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 80/31 dated August 22, 1978). As to newly independent states
("NIS"), the proposed treaty establishes a "clean slate" rule, that is, a
presumption that such states are not bound by treaties made in their behalf
by former colonial or other administering powers, but have the option, in
the case of multilateral agreements, to agree to be bound, and as to bilateral
treaties, to agree to be bound subject to the consent of the other contracting
party.
23The ruling is criticized in a recent article by Professor Keith S. Rosenn of Ohio State
University College of Law entitled "Protecting Contracts from Inflation," 33 Bus. LAW. 729
(January, 1978), in which Professor Rosenn suggests several alternative index clause tech-
niques.2
'See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939), and Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Zurich Insurance Co., 307 U.S. 265 (1939).
2 See 123 CONG. REC. S.16918-16919 (October II, 1977).
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There are two exceptions to the foregoing presumptions. Existing bound-
ary treaties and so-called "dispositive" treaties are both treated as binding
on NIS. The latter category is in the nature of what in American law might
be thought of as covenants running with the land. With both boundary and
dispositive treaties, the interest of the world community in maintaining the
stability of existing expectations is treated in the proposed convention as
overcoming the presumption which otherwise obtains.
For non-NIS (e.g., states formed by the merger of two existing indepen-
dent states), the proposed convention establishes a presumption in favor of
continuity, that is, that such new states continue to be bound by existing
treaties.
The conference was working from a draft proposed by the International
Law Commission (see U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 80/4 dated March 1, 1977) but
substantially recast the ILC's version.
International Courts
Election of L C.J. Judges
On October 31, 1978, the United Nations Security Council and General
Assembly elected Roberto Ago (Italy), Richard R. Baxter (United States),
Abdullah Ali EI-Erian (United Arab Republic), Platon D. Morozov (Soviet
Union) and Jose Sette Camara (Brazil) to nine-year terms as members
(judges) of the International Court of Justice beginning February 6, 1979.
Judge Morozov will be serving a second term, having served as a judge since
1969. The others will be new to the Court and will replace Eduardo Jimenez
de Arechaga (Uruguay), Hardy C. Dillard (United States), Louis Ignacio-
Pinto (Benin) and Federico de Castro (Spain), whose terms will expire
February 5.6
Professor Baxter, who is Manley Hudson Professor at Harvard Law
School and an Honorary Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge University, is
well known in the international law community, having served as President
of the American Society of International Law, Vice President of the Ameri-
can Branch, International Law Association, Editor in Chief of The Ameri-
can Journal of International Law and, most recently, Chief Reporter for
the American Law Institute's new Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. He has been a consultant to the United Nations
Secretariat, the Departments of Defense and State and the Naval War Col-
lege, Counselor on International Law at the State Department and a mem-
ber of the United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on In-
2
'The remaining I.C.J. judges are Nagendra Singh (India), Isaac Forster (Senegal), Andre
Gros (France), Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom) and Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina),
whose terms expire in 1982; and Manfred Lachs (Poland), Hermann Mosler (Federal Republic
of Germany), Tashlim Olawale Elias (Nigeria), Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria) and Shigeru Oda
(Japan), whose terms expire in 1985.
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ternational Humanitarian Law. In 1977 he was elected an Associate of the
Institut du Droit International in Paris.
The triennial election of five of the Court's fifteen judges takes place
simultaneously but separately in the United Nations Security Council and
General Assembly pursuant to a provision in Article 8 of the Court's consti-
tutive instrument, the "Statute," which provides that the two bodies "shall
proceed independently of one another to elect the members of the Court."
This divided responsibility has roots which go back to the deadlock which
prevented the 1907 Hague Peace Conference from establishing a permanent
court; a deadlock ultimately broken, in 1921, by the adoption of a compro-
mise not unlike the "Connecticut compromise" in American constitutional
history.
In practice, the outcomes of the simultaneous but separate votes usually
contain few surprises with respect to the places on the Court which have
traditionally been filled by nationals of those countries which are perma-
nent members of the Security Council.27 But the voting in October did not
follow traditional patterns; while the two candidates who were nationals of
permanent members of the Security Council, Messrs. Baxter and Moro-
zov,2" were elected on the first ballot along with two other candidates,
Messrs. Sette Camara and EI-Erian,29 the margin of victory was not the
customary one. More significant, perhaps, was the seat eventually won by
Mr. Ago. This is one of several seats which customarily go to a national of a
Western European country, but it was won by Mr. Ago only after four
ballots in the General Assembly and fourteen in the Security Council."0
2
'France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and China. China has
not always had one of its nationals on the Court and, in fact, does not currently have one on
the bench.
2 8Another United States national, Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor Emeritus at Yale
Law School, was nominated by the Republic of Panama and received eight votes on the first
ballot in the General Assembly and one vote on the first ballot in the Security Council. See
United Nations Press Releases GA/5868 and SC/3999, each dated October 31, 1978 (hereinaf-
ter "U.N. Press Releases").
2
"in the General Assembly, with 150 votes being cast on the first ballot and an absolute
majority required for election, Sette Camara received 125 votes, Baxter 103, Morozov 92 and
EI-Erian 83. Roberto Ago received the necessary majority only on the fourth ballot. In the
Security Council, where there are fifteen votes, Sette Camara received fourteen on the first
ballot, EI-Erian twelve and Baxter and Morozov nine each. Mr. Ago's election, described infra
n. 5, took fourteen ballots. See U.N. Press Releases.
"
0On the Security Council's first ballot, Mr. Ago and H.W. Jayawardene (Sri Lanka) each
received seven votes and Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar) six, with Eero J. Manner
(Finland) five, Leon Boissier Palun (Benin) three and Prof. McDougal one. Mr. Ago's total
remained at seven for the next three ballots, while Mr. Jayawardene's fell to four on the second
ballot before rising to five for the third and six for the fourth. With the fifth ballot, votes
appear to have switched from Mr. Ago to Mr. Manner, apparently reflecting an attempt to
maintain the seat currently held by Judge de Castro as a "European seat," Mr. Manner, like
Mr. Ago, being a national of a Western European country. By the ninth ballot, however, it
became clear that Mr. Manner could not muster more than six votes, with Mr. Jayawardene
frozen at five. On the tenth and eleventh ballots, Mr. Ago got seven votes, Mr. Manner
dropping to three. Mr. Jayawardene was able to attract six votes on the twelfth ballot, appar-
ently gaining one at Mr. Ago's expense. But on the thirteenth ballot, the seven-five-three
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The pertinent provisions of the Statute have little to say about the nation-
ality of the judges, other than to bar more than one national of any country
from serving on the Court at the same time3 and providing that "in the
body as a whole representation of the main forms of civilization and of the
principal legal systems of the world should be assured." 2 Although no
country is entitled to have one of its nationals elected to the Court, the
geographical distribution of seats on that bench has, for some time, paral-
leled that of the Security Council. The recent elections, their final results
notwithstanding, suggest that that pattern may no longer be secure.
Revision of I.C.J. Rules of Procedure
The International Court of Justice on April 14, 1978, adopted a revised
set of "Rules of Court," effective July 1, 1978, except as to matters then
pending (U.N. Press Release ICJ/374, dated July 3, 1978). The new rules
modify and rearrange but also substantially add to and delete from the rules
adopted May 6, 1946, as amended May 10, 1972.11
Containing some 109 articles, the new rules were adopted by the judges
following their own thorough review of those aspects of the Court's proce-
dures which had been criticized as impediments and deterrents to greater use
of the Court by states and international organizations. Their purpose is thus
to (a) simplify the Court's procedures in both contentious and advisory
proceedings with a view to making them flexible and expeditious, (b) reduce
the expenses for litigants, and (c) facilitate recourse to chambers (i.e., three-
and five-man panels provided for in the Court's Statute which have re-
mained virtually unused) and the use of advisory proceedings.
It remains to be seen whether the judges' efforts will bear fruit. A number
of observers contend that the technical reasons advanced for not using the
Court to resolve disputes and questions of international law are for the most
part rationalizations of decisions made for political reasons unrelated to the
Court's procedures. Still, the judges have now done what they feel they can
do to ease recourse to the Court should this alternative be at all attractive to
national and international decision makers.
pattern reappeared, with Mr. Ago finally able to gain the necessary eighth vote on the four-
teenth ballot as Mr. Jayawardene's total fell to four. See U.N. Press Releases.
'Article 3(l).
"Article 9.
"The old rules are set forth in I.C.J. Acts and Documents, No. 3, pp. 92-149. A summary of
the new ones is available in "Background Note by the Registry on the Revised Rules of
Court," published in 1978, with the complete text to appear as I.C.J. Acts and Documents,
No. 4, pp. 92-161.
